Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://localhost/handle/Hannan/223242
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dc.contributor.authorXuan Liuen_US
dc.contributor.authorZhiyi Lien_US
dc.contributor.authorZuyi Lien_US
dc.date.accessioned2013en_US
dc.date.accessioned2020-04-06T08:22:00Z-
dc.date.available2020-04-06T08:22:00Z-
dc.date.issued2017en_US
dc.identifier.other10.1109/TSG.2015.2508449en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://localhost/handle/Hannan/223242-
dc.description.abstractIt was revealed that modern power systems are at high risk of cyber-attacks, as an attacker can stealthily execute false data injection attacks against the state estimation without knowing the full topology and parameter information of the entire power network. To mitigate the risk, in this paper, we propose a bilevel mixed integer linear programming (MILP) model to determine the least number of measurements to be protected. A decomposition approach is adopted to obtain the suboptimal solution. To further reduce the computation complexity, we also propose to separate the power grid into several subnetworks using a MILP approach and apply distributed protection strategy to each subnetwork. The simulations on the IEEE 14-bus, IEEE 24-bus, IEEE 30-bus, and IEEE 118-bus systems verify the correctness and effectiveness of the proposed protection strategy.en_US
dc.format.extent1802,en_US
dc.format.extent1810en_US
dc.publisherIEEEen_US
dc.relation.haspart7370787.pdfen_US
dc.titleOptimal Protection Strategy Against False Data Injection Attacks in Power Systemsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.journal.volume8en_US
dc.journal.issue4en_US
Appears in Collections:2017

Files in This Item:
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7370787.pdf670.76 kBAdobe PDF
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorXuan Liuen_US
dc.contributor.authorZhiyi Lien_US
dc.contributor.authorZuyi Lien_US
dc.date.accessioned2013en_US
dc.date.accessioned2020-04-06T08:22:00Z-
dc.date.available2020-04-06T08:22:00Z-
dc.date.issued2017en_US
dc.identifier.other10.1109/TSG.2015.2508449en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://localhost/handle/Hannan/223242-
dc.description.abstractIt was revealed that modern power systems are at high risk of cyber-attacks, as an attacker can stealthily execute false data injection attacks against the state estimation without knowing the full topology and parameter information of the entire power network. To mitigate the risk, in this paper, we propose a bilevel mixed integer linear programming (MILP) model to determine the least number of measurements to be protected. A decomposition approach is adopted to obtain the suboptimal solution. To further reduce the computation complexity, we also propose to separate the power grid into several subnetworks using a MILP approach and apply distributed protection strategy to each subnetwork. The simulations on the IEEE 14-bus, IEEE 24-bus, IEEE 30-bus, and IEEE 118-bus systems verify the correctness and effectiveness of the proposed protection strategy.en_US
dc.format.extent1802,en_US
dc.format.extent1810en_US
dc.publisherIEEEen_US
dc.relation.haspart7370787.pdfen_US
dc.titleOptimal Protection Strategy Against False Data Injection Attacks in Power Systemsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.journal.volume8en_US
dc.journal.issue4en_US
Appears in Collections:2017

Files in This Item:
File SizeFormat 
7370787.pdf670.76 kBAdobe PDF
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorXuan Liuen_US
dc.contributor.authorZhiyi Lien_US
dc.contributor.authorZuyi Lien_US
dc.date.accessioned2013en_US
dc.date.accessioned2020-04-06T08:22:00Z-
dc.date.available2020-04-06T08:22:00Z-
dc.date.issued2017en_US
dc.identifier.other10.1109/TSG.2015.2508449en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://localhost/handle/Hannan/223242-
dc.description.abstractIt was revealed that modern power systems are at high risk of cyber-attacks, as an attacker can stealthily execute false data injection attacks against the state estimation without knowing the full topology and parameter information of the entire power network. To mitigate the risk, in this paper, we propose a bilevel mixed integer linear programming (MILP) model to determine the least number of measurements to be protected. A decomposition approach is adopted to obtain the suboptimal solution. To further reduce the computation complexity, we also propose to separate the power grid into several subnetworks using a MILP approach and apply distributed protection strategy to each subnetwork. The simulations on the IEEE 14-bus, IEEE 24-bus, IEEE 30-bus, and IEEE 118-bus systems verify the correctness and effectiveness of the proposed protection strategy.en_US
dc.format.extent1802,en_US
dc.format.extent1810en_US
dc.publisherIEEEen_US
dc.relation.haspart7370787.pdfen_US
dc.titleOptimal Protection Strategy Against False Data Injection Attacks in Power Systemsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.journal.volume8en_US
dc.journal.issue4en_US
Appears in Collections:2017

Files in This Item:
File SizeFormat 
7370787.pdf670.76 kBAdobe PDF