Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://localhost/handle/Hannan/185506
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dc.contributor.authorXuan Liuen_US
dc.contributor.authorZuyi Lien_US
dc.date.accessioned2013en_US
dc.date.accessioned2020-04-06T07:36:52Z-
dc.date.available2020-04-06T07:36:52Z-
dc.date.issued2017en_US
dc.identifier.other10.1109/TSG.2016.2532347en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://localhost/handle/Hannan/185506-
dc.description.abstractIt has been shown that an attacker can stealthily launch false data injection attacks against the state estimation without knowing the full topology and parameter information of the entire power network. In this paper, we propose a heuristic yet effective method to determine a feasible attacking region of a single line, which requires less network information. We use six IEEE standard systems to validate the proposed attacking strategy. This paper can reveal the vulnerability of the real-time topology of a power grid and is very helpful to develop effective protection strategies against topology attacks in smart grids.en_US
dc.format.extent2617,en_US
dc.format.extent2626en_US
dc.publisherIEEEen_US
dc.relation.haspart7426376.pdfen_US
dc.titleLocal Topology Attacks in Smart Gridsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.journal.volume8en_US
dc.journal.issue6en_US
Appears in Collections:2017

Files in This Item:
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7426376.pdf825.61 kBAdobe PDF
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorXuan Liuen_US
dc.contributor.authorZuyi Lien_US
dc.date.accessioned2013en_US
dc.date.accessioned2020-04-06T07:36:52Z-
dc.date.available2020-04-06T07:36:52Z-
dc.date.issued2017en_US
dc.identifier.other10.1109/TSG.2016.2532347en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://localhost/handle/Hannan/185506-
dc.description.abstractIt has been shown that an attacker can stealthily launch false data injection attacks against the state estimation without knowing the full topology and parameter information of the entire power network. In this paper, we propose a heuristic yet effective method to determine a feasible attacking region of a single line, which requires less network information. We use six IEEE standard systems to validate the proposed attacking strategy. This paper can reveal the vulnerability of the real-time topology of a power grid and is very helpful to develop effective protection strategies against topology attacks in smart grids.en_US
dc.format.extent2617,en_US
dc.format.extent2626en_US
dc.publisherIEEEen_US
dc.relation.haspart7426376.pdfen_US
dc.titleLocal Topology Attacks in Smart Gridsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.journal.volume8en_US
dc.journal.issue6en_US
Appears in Collections:2017

Files in This Item:
File SizeFormat 
7426376.pdf825.61 kBAdobe PDF
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorXuan Liuen_US
dc.contributor.authorZuyi Lien_US
dc.date.accessioned2013en_US
dc.date.accessioned2020-04-06T07:36:52Z-
dc.date.available2020-04-06T07:36:52Z-
dc.date.issued2017en_US
dc.identifier.other10.1109/TSG.2016.2532347en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://localhost/handle/Hannan/185506-
dc.description.abstractIt has been shown that an attacker can stealthily launch false data injection attacks against the state estimation without knowing the full topology and parameter information of the entire power network. In this paper, we propose a heuristic yet effective method to determine a feasible attacking region of a single line, which requires less network information. We use six IEEE standard systems to validate the proposed attacking strategy. This paper can reveal the vulnerability of the real-time topology of a power grid and is very helpful to develop effective protection strategies against topology attacks in smart grids.en_US
dc.format.extent2617,en_US
dc.format.extent2626en_US
dc.publisherIEEEen_US
dc.relation.haspart7426376.pdfen_US
dc.titleLocal Topology Attacks in Smart Gridsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.journal.volume8en_US
dc.journal.issue6en_US
Appears in Collections:2017

Files in This Item:
File SizeFormat 
7426376.pdf825.61 kBAdobe PDF