Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://localhost/handle/Hannan/185506
Title: Local Topology Attacks in Smart Grids
Authors: Xuan Liu;Zuyi Li
Year: 2017
Publisher: IEEE
Abstract: It has been shown that an attacker can stealthily launch false data injection attacks against the state estimation without knowing the full topology and parameter information of the entire power network. In this paper, we propose a heuristic yet effective method to determine a feasible attacking region of a single line, which requires less network information. We use six IEEE standard systems to validate the proposed attacking strategy. This paper can reveal the vulnerability of the real-time topology of a power grid and is very helpful to develop effective protection strategies against topology attacks in smart grids.
URI: http://localhost/handle/Hannan/185506
volume: 8
issue: 6
More Information: 2617,
2626
Appears in Collections:2017

Files in This Item:
File SizeFormat 
7426376.pdf825.61 kBAdobe PDF
Title: Local Topology Attacks in Smart Grids
Authors: Xuan Liu;Zuyi Li
Year: 2017
Publisher: IEEE
Abstract: It has been shown that an attacker can stealthily launch false data injection attacks against the state estimation without knowing the full topology and parameter information of the entire power network. In this paper, we propose a heuristic yet effective method to determine a feasible attacking region of a single line, which requires less network information. We use six IEEE standard systems to validate the proposed attacking strategy. This paper can reveal the vulnerability of the real-time topology of a power grid and is very helpful to develop effective protection strategies against topology attacks in smart grids.
URI: http://localhost/handle/Hannan/185506
volume: 8
issue: 6
More Information: 2617,
2626
Appears in Collections:2017

Files in This Item:
File SizeFormat 
7426376.pdf825.61 kBAdobe PDF
Title: Local Topology Attacks in Smart Grids
Authors: Xuan Liu;Zuyi Li
Year: 2017
Publisher: IEEE
Abstract: It has been shown that an attacker can stealthily launch false data injection attacks against the state estimation without knowing the full topology and parameter information of the entire power network. In this paper, we propose a heuristic yet effective method to determine a feasible attacking region of a single line, which requires less network information. We use six IEEE standard systems to validate the proposed attacking strategy. This paper can reveal the vulnerability of the real-time topology of a power grid and is very helpful to develop effective protection strategies against topology attacks in smart grids.
URI: http://localhost/handle/Hannan/185506
volume: 8
issue: 6
More Information: 2617,
2626
Appears in Collections:2017

Files in This Item:
File SizeFormat 
7426376.pdf825.61 kBAdobe PDF