Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://localhost/handle/Hannan/148204
Title: Incentivize Multi-Class Crowd Labeling Under Budget Constraint
Authors: Xiaoying Gan;Xiong Wang;Wenhao Niu;Gai Hang;Xiaohua Tian;Xinbing Wang;Jun Xu
Year: 2017
Publisher: IEEE
Abstract: Crowdsourcing systems allocate tasks to a group of workers over the Internet, which have become an effective paradigm for human-powered problem solving, such as image classification, optical character recognition, and proofreading. In this paper, we focus on incentivizing crowd workers to label a set of multi-class labeling tasks under strict budget constraint. We properly profile the tasks&x2019; difficulty levels and workers&x2019; quality in crowdsourcing systems, where the collected labels are aggregated with sequential Bayesian approach. To stimulate workers to undertake crowd labeling tasks, the interaction between workers and the platform is modeled as a reverse auction. We reveal that the platform utility maximization could be intractable, for which an incentive mechanism that determines the winning bid and payments with polynomial-time computation complexity is developed. Moreover, we theoretically prove that our mechanism is truthful, individually rational, and budget feasible. Through extensive simulations, we demonstrate that our mechanism utilizes budget efficiently to achieve high platform utility with polynomial computation complexity.
URI: http://localhost/handle/Hannan/148204
volume: 35
issue: 4
More Information: 893,
905
Appears in Collections:2017

Files in This Item:
File SizeFormat 
7875084.pdf1.82 MBAdobe PDF
Title: Incentivize Multi-Class Crowd Labeling Under Budget Constraint
Authors: Xiaoying Gan;Xiong Wang;Wenhao Niu;Gai Hang;Xiaohua Tian;Xinbing Wang;Jun Xu
Year: 2017
Publisher: IEEE
Abstract: Crowdsourcing systems allocate tasks to a group of workers over the Internet, which have become an effective paradigm for human-powered problem solving, such as image classification, optical character recognition, and proofreading. In this paper, we focus on incentivizing crowd workers to label a set of multi-class labeling tasks under strict budget constraint. We properly profile the tasks&x2019; difficulty levels and workers&x2019; quality in crowdsourcing systems, where the collected labels are aggregated with sequential Bayesian approach. To stimulate workers to undertake crowd labeling tasks, the interaction between workers and the platform is modeled as a reverse auction. We reveal that the platform utility maximization could be intractable, for which an incentive mechanism that determines the winning bid and payments with polynomial-time computation complexity is developed. Moreover, we theoretically prove that our mechanism is truthful, individually rational, and budget feasible. Through extensive simulations, we demonstrate that our mechanism utilizes budget efficiently to achieve high platform utility with polynomial computation complexity.
URI: http://localhost/handle/Hannan/148204
volume: 35
issue: 4
More Information: 893,
905
Appears in Collections:2017

Files in This Item:
File SizeFormat 
7875084.pdf1.82 MBAdobe PDF
Title: Incentivize Multi-Class Crowd Labeling Under Budget Constraint
Authors: Xiaoying Gan;Xiong Wang;Wenhao Niu;Gai Hang;Xiaohua Tian;Xinbing Wang;Jun Xu
Year: 2017
Publisher: IEEE
Abstract: Crowdsourcing systems allocate tasks to a group of workers over the Internet, which have become an effective paradigm for human-powered problem solving, such as image classification, optical character recognition, and proofreading. In this paper, we focus on incentivizing crowd workers to label a set of multi-class labeling tasks under strict budget constraint. We properly profile the tasks&x2019; difficulty levels and workers&x2019; quality in crowdsourcing systems, where the collected labels are aggregated with sequential Bayesian approach. To stimulate workers to undertake crowd labeling tasks, the interaction between workers and the platform is modeled as a reverse auction. We reveal that the platform utility maximization could be intractable, for which an incentive mechanism that determines the winning bid and payments with polynomial-time computation complexity is developed. Moreover, we theoretically prove that our mechanism is truthful, individually rational, and budget feasible. Through extensive simulations, we demonstrate that our mechanism utilizes budget efficiently to achieve high platform utility with polynomial computation complexity.
URI: http://localhost/handle/Hannan/148204
volume: 35
issue: 4
More Information: 893,
905
Appears in Collections:2017

Files in This Item:
File SizeFormat 
7875084.pdf1.82 MBAdobe PDF