Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://localhost/handle/Hannan/141172
Full metadata record
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Xiaoying Gan | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Yuqing Li | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Weiwei Wang | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Luoyi Fu | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Xinbing Wang | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2013 | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-04-06T07:08:21Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2020-04-06T07:08:21Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2017 | en_US |
dc.identifier.other | 10.1109/JSAC.2017.2672379 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | http://localhost/handle/Hannan/141172 | - |
dc.description.abstract | In this paper, we propose a novel game-based incentive mechanism for multi-resource sharing, where users are motivated to share their idle resources in view of conditional voluntary. Through social networking service platforms, such a crowdsourcing service fully explores the significant influence and computing potential of mobile social networks. Specifically, a combination of task allocation process, profit transfer process, and reputation updating process are involved in this sharing incentive mechanism, satisfying truthfulness, individual rationality, and robustness. To maintain the social fairness-efficiency tradeoff, we further develop a resource sharing algorithm on the basis of dominant resource fairness, revealing that the sacrifice of fairness properties is necessary for the improvement of efficiency. Real-world traces from Facebook are numerically studied, validating social fairness and efficiency of our social crowdsourcing mechanism. | en_US |
dc.format.extent | 795, | en_US |
dc.format.extent | 808 | en_US |
dc.publisher | IEEE | en_US |
dc.relation.haspart | 7859267.pdf | en_US |
dc.title | Social Crowdsourcing to Friends: An Incentive Mechanism for Multi-Resource Sharing | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |
dc.journal.volume | 35 | en_US |
dc.journal.issue | 3 | en_US |
Appears in Collections: | 2017 |
Files in This Item:
File | Size | Format | |
---|---|---|---|
7859267.pdf | 1.26 MB | Adobe PDF |
Full metadata record
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Xiaoying Gan | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Yuqing Li | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Weiwei Wang | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Luoyi Fu | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Xinbing Wang | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2013 | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-04-06T07:08:21Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2020-04-06T07:08:21Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2017 | en_US |
dc.identifier.other | 10.1109/JSAC.2017.2672379 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | http://localhost/handle/Hannan/141172 | - |
dc.description.abstract | In this paper, we propose a novel game-based incentive mechanism for multi-resource sharing, where users are motivated to share their idle resources in view of conditional voluntary. Through social networking service platforms, such a crowdsourcing service fully explores the significant influence and computing potential of mobile social networks. Specifically, a combination of task allocation process, profit transfer process, and reputation updating process are involved in this sharing incentive mechanism, satisfying truthfulness, individual rationality, and robustness. To maintain the social fairness-efficiency tradeoff, we further develop a resource sharing algorithm on the basis of dominant resource fairness, revealing that the sacrifice of fairness properties is necessary for the improvement of efficiency. Real-world traces from Facebook are numerically studied, validating social fairness and efficiency of our social crowdsourcing mechanism. | en_US |
dc.format.extent | 795, | en_US |
dc.format.extent | 808 | en_US |
dc.publisher | IEEE | en_US |
dc.relation.haspart | 7859267.pdf | en_US |
dc.title | Social Crowdsourcing to Friends: An Incentive Mechanism for Multi-Resource Sharing | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |
dc.journal.volume | 35 | en_US |
dc.journal.issue | 3 | en_US |
Appears in Collections: | 2017 |
Files in This Item:
File | Size | Format | |
---|---|---|---|
7859267.pdf | 1.26 MB | Adobe PDF |
Full metadata record
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Xiaoying Gan | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Yuqing Li | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Weiwei Wang | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Luoyi Fu | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Xinbing Wang | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2013 | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-04-06T07:08:21Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2020-04-06T07:08:21Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2017 | en_US |
dc.identifier.other | 10.1109/JSAC.2017.2672379 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | http://localhost/handle/Hannan/141172 | - |
dc.description.abstract | In this paper, we propose a novel game-based incentive mechanism for multi-resource sharing, where users are motivated to share their idle resources in view of conditional voluntary. Through social networking service platforms, such a crowdsourcing service fully explores the significant influence and computing potential of mobile social networks. Specifically, a combination of task allocation process, profit transfer process, and reputation updating process are involved in this sharing incentive mechanism, satisfying truthfulness, individual rationality, and robustness. To maintain the social fairness-efficiency tradeoff, we further develop a resource sharing algorithm on the basis of dominant resource fairness, revealing that the sacrifice of fairness properties is necessary for the improvement of efficiency. Real-world traces from Facebook are numerically studied, validating social fairness and efficiency of our social crowdsourcing mechanism. | en_US |
dc.format.extent | 795, | en_US |
dc.format.extent | 808 | en_US |
dc.publisher | IEEE | en_US |
dc.relation.haspart | 7859267.pdf | en_US |
dc.title | Social Crowdsourcing to Friends: An Incentive Mechanism for Multi-Resource Sharing | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |
dc.journal.volume | 35 | en_US |
dc.journal.issue | 3 | en_US |
Appears in Collections: | 2017 |
Files in This Item:
File | Size | Format | |
---|---|---|---|
7859267.pdf | 1.26 MB | Adobe PDF |