Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://localhost/handle/Hannan/625228
Title: A Contract-Based Incentive Mechanism for Delayed Traffic Offloading in Cellular Networks
Authors: Yuqing Li;Jinbei Zhang;Xiaoying Gan;Luoyi Fu;Hui Yu;Xinbing Wang
subject: Delayed offloading|contract theory|delay and price sensitivity|incentive mechanism
Year: 2016
Publisher: IEEE
Abstract: Delayed traffic offloading is a promising paradigm to alleviate the cellular network congestion caused by explosive traffic demands. As we all know, in mobile networks, the delay profile for traffic is remarkable due to users' mobility. How to exploit user delay tolerance to improve the profit of operator as well as mobile users becomes a big challenge. In this paper, we model this delayed offloading process as a monopoly market based on contract theory, where operator acts as the monopolist setting up the optimal contract by statistical information on user satisfaction. We propose an incentive mechanism to motivate users to leverage their delay and price sensitivity in exchange for service cost. To capture the heterogeneity of user satisfaction, we classify users into different types. Each user chooses a proper quality-price contract item according to its type. More specifically, we investigate this delayed offloading scheme under strongly incomplete information scenario, where user type is private information. We derive an optimal contract, which maximizes operator's profit for both the continuous-user-type model and the discrete-user-type model. Numerical results validate the effectiveness of our incentive mechanism for delayed traffic offloading in cellular networks.
Description: 
URI: http://localhost/handle/Hannan/161284
http://localhost/handle/Hannan/625228
ISSN: 1536-1276
volume: 15
issue: 8
Appears in Collections:2016

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Title: A Contract-Based Incentive Mechanism for Delayed Traffic Offloading in Cellular Networks
Authors: Yuqing Li;Jinbei Zhang;Xiaoying Gan;Luoyi Fu;Hui Yu;Xinbing Wang
subject: Delayed offloading|contract theory|delay and price sensitivity|incentive mechanism
Year: 2016
Publisher: IEEE
Abstract: Delayed traffic offloading is a promising paradigm to alleviate the cellular network congestion caused by explosive traffic demands. As we all know, in mobile networks, the delay profile for traffic is remarkable due to users' mobility. How to exploit user delay tolerance to improve the profit of operator as well as mobile users becomes a big challenge. In this paper, we model this delayed offloading process as a monopoly market based on contract theory, where operator acts as the monopolist setting up the optimal contract by statistical information on user satisfaction. We propose an incentive mechanism to motivate users to leverage their delay and price sensitivity in exchange for service cost. To capture the heterogeneity of user satisfaction, we classify users into different types. Each user chooses a proper quality-price contract item according to its type. More specifically, we investigate this delayed offloading scheme under strongly incomplete information scenario, where user type is private information. We derive an optimal contract, which maximizes operator's profit for both the continuous-user-type model and the discrete-user-type model. Numerical results validate the effectiveness of our incentive mechanism for delayed traffic offloading in cellular networks.
Description: 
URI: http://localhost/handle/Hannan/161284
http://localhost/handle/Hannan/625228
ISSN: 1536-1276
volume: 15
issue: 8
Appears in Collections:2016

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
7456324.pdf1.43 MBAdobe PDFThumbnail
Preview File
Title: A Contract-Based Incentive Mechanism for Delayed Traffic Offloading in Cellular Networks
Authors: Yuqing Li;Jinbei Zhang;Xiaoying Gan;Luoyi Fu;Hui Yu;Xinbing Wang
subject: Delayed offloading|contract theory|delay and price sensitivity|incentive mechanism
Year: 2016
Publisher: IEEE
Abstract: Delayed traffic offloading is a promising paradigm to alleviate the cellular network congestion caused by explosive traffic demands. As we all know, in mobile networks, the delay profile for traffic is remarkable due to users' mobility. How to exploit user delay tolerance to improve the profit of operator as well as mobile users becomes a big challenge. In this paper, we model this delayed offloading process as a monopoly market based on contract theory, where operator acts as the monopolist setting up the optimal contract by statistical information on user satisfaction. We propose an incentive mechanism to motivate users to leverage their delay and price sensitivity in exchange for service cost. To capture the heterogeneity of user satisfaction, we classify users into different types. Each user chooses a proper quality-price contract item according to its type. More specifically, we investigate this delayed offloading scheme under strongly incomplete information scenario, where user type is private information. We derive an optimal contract, which maximizes operator's profit for both the continuous-user-type model and the discrete-user-type model. Numerical results validate the effectiveness of our incentive mechanism for delayed traffic offloading in cellular networks.
Description: 
URI: http://localhost/handle/Hannan/161284
http://localhost/handle/Hannan/625228
ISSN: 1536-1276
volume: 15
issue: 8
Appears in Collections:2016

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
7456324.pdf1.43 MBAdobe PDFThumbnail
Preview File