Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://localhost/handle/Hannan/606342
Title: Improved impossible differential attack on reduced version of Camellia with FL / FL −1 functions
Authors: Ya Liu;Anren Yang;Zhiqiang Liu;Wei Li;Qingju Wang;Liang Song;Dawu Gu
subject: data complexity|Camellia-192|time complexity|ISO international standard|Camellia-256|IEC international standard|cryptographic applications|impossible differential attack|memory complexity|Camellia standard
Year: 2016
Publisher: IEEE
Abstract: As an ISO/IEC international standard, Camellia has been used in various cryptographic applications. In this study, the authors present the best currently known attacks on Camellia-192/256 with key-dependent layers <i>FL</i>/<i>FL</i>-1 (without the whitening layers) by taking advantage of the intrinsic weakness of keyed functions, the redundancy of key schedule and the early abort technique. Specifically, the authors mount the first impossible differential attack on 13-round Camellia-192 with 2124.79 chosen plaintexts, 2186.09 13-round encryptions and 2129.79 bytes, while the analysis for the biggest number of rounds in previous results on Camellia-192 worked on 12 rounds. Furthermore, the authors successfully attack on 14-round Camellia-256 with 2122.14 chosen plaintexts, 2228.33 14-round encryptions and 2134.14 bytes. Compared with the previously best known attack on 14-round Camellia-256, the time and memory complexities are reduced by 29.87 times and 246.06 times, and the data complexity is comparable.
URI: http://localhost/handle/Hannan/138891
http://localhost/handle/Hannan/606342
ISSN: 1751-8709
1751-8717
volume: 10
issue: 6
Appears in Collections:2016

Files in This Item:
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Title: Improved impossible differential attack on reduced version of Camellia with FL / FL −1 functions
Authors: Ya Liu;Anren Yang;Zhiqiang Liu;Wei Li;Qingju Wang;Liang Song;Dawu Gu
subject: data complexity|Camellia-192|time complexity|ISO international standard|Camellia-256|IEC international standard|cryptographic applications|impossible differential attack|memory complexity|Camellia standard
Year: 2016
Publisher: IEEE
Abstract: As an ISO/IEC international standard, Camellia has been used in various cryptographic applications. In this study, the authors present the best currently known attacks on Camellia-192/256 with key-dependent layers <i>FL</i>/<i>FL</i>-1 (without the whitening layers) by taking advantage of the intrinsic weakness of keyed functions, the redundancy of key schedule and the early abort technique. Specifically, the authors mount the first impossible differential attack on 13-round Camellia-192 with 2124.79 chosen plaintexts, 2186.09 13-round encryptions and 2129.79 bytes, while the analysis for the biggest number of rounds in previous results on Camellia-192 worked on 12 rounds. Furthermore, the authors successfully attack on 14-round Camellia-256 with 2122.14 chosen plaintexts, 2228.33 14-round encryptions and 2134.14 bytes. Compared with the previously best known attack on 14-round Camellia-256, the time and memory complexities are reduced by 29.87 times and 246.06 times, and the data complexity is comparable.
URI: http://localhost/handle/Hannan/138891
http://localhost/handle/Hannan/606342
ISSN: 1751-8709
1751-8717
volume: 10
issue: 6
Appears in Collections:2016

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
7637114.pdf1.87 MBAdobe PDFThumbnail
Preview File
Title: Improved impossible differential attack on reduced version of Camellia with FL / FL −1 functions
Authors: Ya Liu;Anren Yang;Zhiqiang Liu;Wei Li;Qingju Wang;Liang Song;Dawu Gu
subject: data complexity|Camellia-192|time complexity|ISO international standard|Camellia-256|IEC international standard|cryptographic applications|impossible differential attack|memory complexity|Camellia standard
Year: 2016
Publisher: IEEE
Abstract: As an ISO/IEC international standard, Camellia has been used in various cryptographic applications. In this study, the authors present the best currently known attacks on Camellia-192/256 with key-dependent layers <i>FL</i>/<i>FL</i>-1 (without the whitening layers) by taking advantage of the intrinsic weakness of keyed functions, the redundancy of key schedule and the early abort technique. Specifically, the authors mount the first impossible differential attack on 13-round Camellia-192 with 2124.79 chosen plaintexts, 2186.09 13-round encryptions and 2129.79 bytes, while the analysis for the biggest number of rounds in previous results on Camellia-192 worked on 12 rounds. Furthermore, the authors successfully attack on 14-round Camellia-256 with 2122.14 chosen plaintexts, 2228.33 14-round encryptions and 2134.14 bytes. Compared with the previously best known attack on 14-round Camellia-256, the time and memory complexities are reduced by 29.87 times and 246.06 times, and the data complexity is comparable.
URI: http://localhost/handle/Hannan/138891
http://localhost/handle/Hannan/606342
ISSN: 1751-8709
1751-8717
volume: 10
issue: 6
Appears in Collections:2016

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
7637114.pdf1.87 MBAdobe PDFThumbnail
Preview File