Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://localhost/handle/Hannan/526215
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dc.contributorSch. of Control Sci. & Eng., Shandong Univ., Jinan, Chinaen_US
dc.contributor.authorBing-Chang Wang ; Ji-Feng Zhangen_US
dc.date.accessioned2020-05-20T05:59:44Z-
dc.date.available2020-05-20T05:59:44Z-
dc.date.issued2014en_US
dc.identifier.issn0018-9286en_US
dc.identifier.other10.1109/TAC.2014.2301576en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://localhost/handle/Hannan/239819en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://localhost/handle/Hannan/526215-
dc.description.abstractIn this technical note, hierarchical games are investigated for multi-agent systems involving a leader and a large number of followers with infinite horizon tracking-type costs. By jointly analyzing dynamic equations and index functions of all agents, a set of centralized Stackelberg equilibrium strategies is given. Then, by using the mean field approach and the brute force method, a set of distributed strategies is designed. Under mild conditions, it is shown that the closed-loop system is uniformly stable and the set of distributed strategies is an ε-Stackelberg equilibrium.en_US
dc.languageEnglishen_US
dc.publisherIEEEen_US
dc.relation.haspart6716957.pdfen_US
dc.subjectclosed loop systems; game theory; multi-agent systems; brute force method; centralized Stackelberg equilibrium strategies; closed-loop system; distributed ε-Stackelberg equilibria; distributed strategies; dynamic equations; hierarchical games; hierarchical mean field games; index functions; infinite horizon tracking-type costs; mean field approach; multiagent systems; Aggregates; Closed loop systems; Equations; Games; Indexes; Mathematical model; Monopoly; Distributed strategy; Stackelberg equilibrium; mean field approach; multi-agent system; tracking control;en_US
dc.titleHierarchical Mean Field Games for Multiagent Systems With Tracking-Type Costs: Distributed <formula formulatype="inline"> <img src="/images/tex/20162.gif" alt="\\varepsilon "> </formula>-Stackelberg Equilibriaen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.journal.volume59en_US
dc.journal.issue8en_US
dc.journal.titleAutomatic Control, IEEE Transactions onen_US
Appears in Collections:2014

Files in This Item:
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6716957.pdf1.67 MBAdobe PDF
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributorSch. of Control Sci. & Eng., Shandong Univ., Jinan, Chinaen_US
dc.contributor.authorBing-Chang Wang ; Ji-Feng Zhangen_US
dc.date.accessioned2020-05-20T05:59:44Z-
dc.date.available2020-05-20T05:59:44Z-
dc.date.issued2014en_US
dc.identifier.issn0018-9286en_US
dc.identifier.other10.1109/TAC.2014.2301576en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://localhost/handle/Hannan/239819en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://localhost/handle/Hannan/526215-
dc.description.abstractIn this technical note, hierarchical games are investigated for multi-agent systems involving a leader and a large number of followers with infinite horizon tracking-type costs. By jointly analyzing dynamic equations and index functions of all agents, a set of centralized Stackelberg equilibrium strategies is given. Then, by using the mean field approach and the brute force method, a set of distributed strategies is designed. Under mild conditions, it is shown that the closed-loop system is uniformly stable and the set of distributed strategies is an ε-Stackelberg equilibrium.en_US
dc.languageEnglishen_US
dc.publisherIEEEen_US
dc.relation.haspart6716957.pdfen_US
dc.subjectclosed loop systems; game theory; multi-agent systems; brute force method; centralized Stackelberg equilibrium strategies; closed-loop system; distributed &#x03B5;-Stackelberg equilibria; distributed strategies; dynamic equations; hierarchical games; hierarchical mean field games; index functions; infinite horizon tracking-type costs; mean field approach; multiagent systems; Aggregates; Closed loop systems; Equations; Games; Indexes; Mathematical model; Monopoly; Distributed strategy; Stackelberg equilibrium; mean field approach; multi-agent system; tracking control;en_US
dc.titleHierarchical Mean Field Games for Multiagent Systems With Tracking-Type Costs: Distributed <formula formulatype="inline"> <img src="/images/tex/20162.gif" alt="\\varepsilon "> </formula>-Stackelberg Equilibriaen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.journal.volume59en_US
dc.journal.issue8en_US
dc.journal.titleAutomatic Control, IEEE Transactions onen_US
Appears in Collections:2014

Files in This Item:
File SizeFormat 
6716957.pdf1.67 MBAdobe PDF
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributorSch. of Control Sci. & Eng., Shandong Univ., Jinan, Chinaen_US
dc.contributor.authorBing-Chang Wang ; Ji-Feng Zhangen_US
dc.date.accessioned2020-05-20T05:59:44Z-
dc.date.available2020-05-20T05:59:44Z-
dc.date.issued2014en_US
dc.identifier.issn0018-9286en_US
dc.identifier.other10.1109/TAC.2014.2301576en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://localhost/handle/Hannan/239819en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://localhost/handle/Hannan/526215-
dc.description.abstractIn this technical note, hierarchical games are investigated for multi-agent systems involving a leader and a large number of followers with infinite horizon tracking-type costs. By jointly analyzing dynamic equations and index functions of all agents, a set of centralized Stackelberg equilibrium strategies is given. Then, by using the mean field approach and the brute force method, a set of distributed strategies is designed. Under mild conditions, it is shown that the closed-loop system is uniformly stable and the set of distributed strategies is an ε-Stackelberg equilibrium.en_US
dc.languageEnglishen_US
dc.publisherIEEEen_US
dc.relation.haspart6716957.pdfen_US
dc.subjectclosed loop systems; game theory; multi-agent systems; brute force method; centralized Stackelberg equilibrium strategies; closed-loop system; distributed &#x03B5;-Stackelberg equilibria; distributed strategies; dynamic equations; hierarchical games; hierarchical mean field games; index functions; infinite horizon tracking-type costs; mean field approach; multiagent systems; Aggregates; Closed loop systems; Equations; Games; Indexes; Mathematical model; Monopoly; Distributed strategy; Stackelberg equilibrium; mean field approach; multi-agent system; tracking control;en_US
dc.titleHierarchical Mean Field Games for Multiagent Systems With Tracking-Type Costs: Distributed <formula formulatype="inline"> <img src="/images/tex/20162.gif" alt="\\varepsilon "> </formula>-Stackelberg Equilibriaen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.journal.volume59en_US
dc.journal.issue8en_US
dc.journal.titleAutomatic Control, IEEE Transactions onen_US
Appears in Collections:2014

Files in This Item:
File SizeFormat 
6716957.pdf1.67 MBAdobe PDF