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Title: | Hierarchical Mean Field Games for Multiagent Systems With Tracking-Type Costs: Distributed <formula formulatype="inline"> <img src="/images/tex/20162.gif" alt="\\varepsilon "> </formula>-Stackelberg Equilibria |

Authors: | Sch. of Control Sci. & Eng., Shandong Univ., Jinan, China;Bing-Chang Wang ; Ji-Feng Zhang |

subject: | closed loop systems; game theory; multi-agent systems; brute force method; centralized Stackelberg equilibrium strategies; closed-loop system; distributed ε-Stackelberg equilibria; distributed strategies; dynamic equations; hierarchical games; hierarchical mean field games; index functions; infinite horizon tracking-type costs; mean field approach; multiagent systems; Aggregates; Closed loop systems; Equations; Games; Indexes; Mathematical model; Monopoly; Distributed strategy; Stackelberg equilibrium; mean field approach; multi-agent system; tracking control; |

Year: | 2014 |

Publisher: | IEEE |

Abstract: | In this technical note, hierarchical games are investigated for multi-agent systems involving a leader and a large number of followers with infinite horizon tracking-type costs. By jointly analyzing dynamic equations and index functions of all agents, a set of centralized Stackelberg equilibrium strategies is given. Then, by using the mean field approach and the brute force method, a set of distributed strategies is designed. Under mild conditions, it is shown that the closed-loop system is uniformly stable and the set of distributed strategies is an ε-Stackelberg equilibrium. |

URI: | http://localhost/handle/Hannan/239819 http://localhost/handle/Hannan/526215 |

ISSN: | 0018-9286 |

volume: | 59 |

issue: | 8 |

Appears in Collections: | 2014 |

Files in This Item:

File | Size | Format | |
---|---|---|---|

6716957.pdf | 1.67 MB | Adobe PDF |

Title: | Hierarchical Mean Field Games for Multiagent Systems With Tracking-Type Costs: Distributed <formula formulatype="inline"> <img src="/images/tex/20162.gif" alt="\\varepsilon "> </formula>-Stackelberg Equilibria |

Authors: | Sch. of Control Sci. & Eng., Shandong Univ., Jinan, China;Bing-Chang Wang ; Ji-Feng Zhang |

subject: | closed loop systems; game theory; multi-agent systems; brute force method; centralized Stackelberg equilibrium strategies; closed-loop system; distributed ε-Stackelberg equilibria; distributed strategies; dynamic equations; hierarchical games; hierarchical mean field games; index functions; infinite horizon tracking-type costs; mean field approach; multiagent systems; Aggregates; Closed loop systems; Equations; Games; Indexes; Mathematical model; Monopoly; Distributed strategy; Stackelberg equilibrium; mean field approach; multi-agent system; tracking control; |

Year: | 2014 |

Publisher: | IEEE |

Abstract: | In this technical note, hierarchical games are investigated for multi-agent systems involving a leader and a large number of followers with infinite horizon tracking-type costs. By jointly analyzing dynamic equations and index functions of all agents, a set of centralized Stackelberg equilibrium strategies is given. Then, by using the mean field approach and the brute force method, a set of distributed strategies is designed. Under mild conditions, it is shown that the closed-loop system is uniformly stable and the set of distributed strategies is an ε-Stackelberg equilibrium. |

URI: | http://localhost/handle/Hannan/239819 http://localhost/handle/Hannan/526215 |

ISSN: | 0018-9286 |

volume: | 59 |

issue: | 8 |

Appears in Collections: | 2014 |

Files in This Item:

File | Size | Format | |
---|---|---|---|

6716957.pdf | 1.67 MB | Adobe PDF |

Title: | Hierarchical Mean Field Games for Multiagent Systems With Tracking-Type Costs: Distributed <formula formulatype="inline"> <img src="/images/tex/20162.gif" alt="\\varepsilon "> </formula>-Stackelberg Equilibria |

Authors: | Sch. of Control Sci. & Eng., Shandong Univ., Jinan, China;Bing-Chang Wang ; Ji-Feng Zhang |

subject: | closed loop systems; game theory; multi-agent systems; brute force method; centralized Stackelberg equilibrium strategies; closed-loop system; distributed ε-Stackelberg equilibria; distributed strategies; dynamic equations; hierarchical games; hierarchical mean field games; index functions; infinite horizon tracking-type costs; mean field approach; multiagent systems; Aggregates; Closed loop systems; Equations; Games; Indexes; Mathematical model; Monopoly; Distributed strategy; Stackelberg equilibrium; mean field approach; multi-agent system; tracking control; |

Year: | 2014 |

Publisher: | IEEE |

Abstract: | In this technical note, hierarchical games are investigated for multi-agent systems involving a leader and a large number of followers with infinite horizon tracking-type costs. By jointly analyzing dynamic equations and index functions of all agents, a set of centralized Stackelberg equilibrium strategies is given. Then, by using the mean field approach and the brute force method, a set of distributed strategies is designed. Under mild conditions, it is shown that the closed-loop system is uniformly stable and the set of distributed strategies is an ε-Stackelberg equilibrium. |

URI: | http://localhost/handle/Hannan/239819 http://localhost/handle/Hannan/526215 |

ISSN: | 0018-9286 |

volume: | 59 |

issue: | 8 |

Appears in Collections: | 2014 |

Files in This Item:

File | Size | Format | |
---|---|---|---|

6716957.pdf | 1.67 MB | Adobe PDF |