Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://localhost/handle/Hannan/526215
 Title: Hierarchical Mean Field Games for Multiagent Systems With Tracking-Type Costs: Distributed -Stackelberg Equilibria Authors: Sch. of Control Sci. & Eng., Shandong Univ., Jinan, China;Bing-Chang Wang ; Ji-Feng Zhang subject: closed loop systems; game theory; multi-agent systems; brute force method; centralized Stackelberg equilibrium strategies; closed-loop system; distributed ε-Stackelberg equilibria; distributed strategies; dynamic equations; hierarchical games; hierarchical mean field games; index functions; infinite horizon tracking-type costs; mean field approach; multiagent systems; Aggregates; Closed loop systems; Equations; Games; Indexes; Mathematical model; Monopoly; Distributed strategy; Stackelberg equilibrium; mean field approach; multi-agent system; tracking control; Year: 2014 Publisher: IEEE Abstract: In this technical note, hierarchical games are investigated for multi-agent systems involving a leader and a large number of followers with infinite horizon tracking-type costs. By jointly analyzing dynamic equations and index functions of all agents, a set of centralized Stackelberg equilibrium strategies is given. Then, by using the mean field approach and the brute force method, a set of distributed strategies is designed. Under mild conditions, it is shown that the closed-loop system is uniformly stable and the set of distributed strategies is an ε-Stackelberg equilibrium. URI: http://localhost/handle/Hannan/239819http://localhost/handle/Hannan/526215 ISSN: 0018-9286 volume: 59 issue: 8 Appears in Collections: 2014

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