Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://localhost/handle/Hannan/526215
Title: Hierarchical Mean Field Games for Multiagent Systems With Tracking-Type Costs: Distributed <formula formulatype="inline"> <img src="/images/tex/20162.gif" alt="\\varepsilon "> </formula>-Stackelberg Equilibria
Authors: Sch. of Control Sci. & Eng., Shandong Univ., Jinan, China;Bing-Chang Wang ; Ji-Feng Zhang
subject: closed loop systems; game theory; multi-agent systems; brute force method; centralized Stackelberg equilibrium strategies; closed-loop system; distributed &#x03B5;-Stackelberg equilibria; distributed strategies; dynamic equations; hierarchical games; hierarchical mean field games; index functions; infinite horizon tracking-type costs; mean field approach; multiagent systems; Aggregates; Closed loop systems; Equations; Games; Indexes; Mathematical model; Monopoly; Distributed strategy; Stackelberg equilibrium; mean field approach; multi-agent system; tracking control;
Year: 2014
Publisher: IEEE
Abstract: In this technical note, hierarchical games are investigated for multi-agent systems involving a leader and a large number of followers with infinite horizon tracking-type costs. By jointly analyzing dynamic equations and index functions of all agents, a set of centralized Stackelberg equilibrium strategies is given. Then, by using the mean field approach and the brute force method, a set of distributed strategies is designed. Under mild conditions, it is shown that the closed-loop system is uniformly stable and the set of distributed strategies is an ε-Stackelberg equilibrium.
URI: http://localhost/handle/Hannan/239819
http://localhost/handle/Hannan/526215
ISSN: 0018-9286
volume: 59
issue: 8
Appears in Collections:2014

Files in This Item:
File SizeFormat 
6716957.pdf1.67 MBAdobe PDF
Title: Hierarchical Mean Field Games for Multiagent Systems With Tracking-Type Costs: Distributed <formula formulatype="inline"> <img src="/images/tex/20162.gif" alt="\\varepsilon "> </formula>-Stackelberg Equilibria
Authors: Sch. of Control Sci. & Eng., Shandong Univ., Jinan, China;Bing-Chang Wang ; Ji-Feng Zhang
subject: closed loop systems; game theory; multi-agent systems; brute force method; centralized Stackelberg equilibrium strategies; closed-loop system; distributed &#x03B5;-Stackelberg equilibria; distributed strategies; dynamic equations; hierarchical games; hierarchical mean field games; index functions; infinite horizon tracking-type costs; mean field approach; multiagent systems; Aggregates; Closed loop systems; Equations; Games; Indexes; Mathematical model; Monopoly; Distributed strategy; Stackelberg equilibrium; mean field approach; multi-agent system; tracking control;
Year: 2014
Publisher: IEEE
Abstract: In this technical note, hierarchical games are investigated for multi-agent systems involving a leader and a large number of followers with infinite horizon tracking-type costs. By jointly analyzing dynamic equations and index functions of all agents, a set of centralized Stackelberg equilibrium strategies is given. Then, by using the mean field approach and the brute force method, a set of distributed strategies is designed. Under mild conditions, it is shown that the closed-loop system is uniformly stable and the set of distributed strategies is an ε-Stackelberg equilibrium.
URI: http://localhost/handle/Hannan/239819
http://localhost/handle/Hannan/526215
ISSN: 0018-9286
volume: 59
issue: 8
Appears in Collections:2014

Files in This Item:
File SizeFormat 
6716957.pdf1.67 MBAdobe PDF
Title: Hierarchical Mean Field Games for Multiagent Systems With Tracking-Type Costs: Distributed <formula formulatype="inline"> <img src="/images/tex/20162.gif" alt="\\varepsilon "> </formula>-Stackelberg Equilibria
Authors: Sch. of Control Sci. & Eng., Shandong Univ., Jinan, China;Bing-Chang Wang ; Ji-Feng Zhang
subject: closed loop systems; game theory; multi-agent systems; brute force method; centralized Stackelberg equilibrium strategies; closed-loop system; distributed &#x03B5;-Stackelberg equilibria; distributed strategies; dynamic equations; hierarchical games; hierarchical mean field games; index functions; infinite horizon tracking-type costs; mean field approach; multiagent systems; Aggregates; Closed loop systems; Equations; Games; Indexes; Mathematical model; Monopoly; Distributed strategy; Stackelberg equilibrium; mean field approach; multi-agent system; tracking control;
Year: 2014
Publisher: IEEE
Abstract: In this technical note, hierarchical games are investigated for multi-agent systems involving a leader and a large number of followers with infinite horizon tracking-type costs. By jointly analyzing dynamic equations and index functions of all agents, a set of centralized Stackelberg equilibrium strategies is given. Then, by using the mean field approach and the brute force method, a set of distributed strategies is designed. Under mild conditions, it is shown that the closed-loop system is uniformly stable and the set of distributed strategies is an ε-Stackelberg equilibrium.
URI: http://localhost/handle/Hannan/239819
http://localhost/handle/Hannan/526215
ISSN: 0018-9286
volume: 59
issue: 8
Appears in Collections:2014

Files in This Item:
File SizeFormat 
6716957.pdf1.67 MBAdobe PDF