Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://localhost/handle/Hannan/144255
Title: Toward Cooperation by Carrier Aggregation in Heterogeneous Networks: A Hierarchical Game Approach
Authors: Pu Yuan;Yong Xiao;Guoan Bi;Liren Zhang
Year: 2017
Publisher: IEEE
Abstract: This paper studies the resource-allocation problem for a heterogeneous network (HetNet) in which the spectrum owned by a macrocell operator (MCO) can be shared by both unlicensed users (UUs) and licensed users (LUs). We formulate a novel hierarchical game theoretic framework to jointly optimize the transmit powers and subband allocations of the UUs and the pricing strategies of the MCO. In our framework, an overlapping coalition formation (OCF) game has been introduced to model the cooperative behaviors of the UUs. We then integrate this OCF game into a Stackelberg game-based hierarchical framework. We prove that the core of our proposed OCF game is nonempty and introduce an optimal subband-allocation scheme for UUs. A simple distributed algorithm is proposed for UUs to autonomously form an optimal coalition formation (CF) structure. The Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) of the proposed hierarchical game is derived, and its uniqueness and optimality are proved. A distributed joint optimization algorithm is also proposed to approach the SE of the game with limited information exchanges between the MCO and the UUs.
URI: http://localhost/handle/Hannan/144255
volume: 66
issue: 2
More Information: 1670,
1683
Appears in Collections:2017

Files in This Item:
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7458887.pdf1.18 MBAdobe PDF
Title: Toward Cooperation by Carrier Aggregation in Heterogeneous Networks: A Hierarchical Game Approach
Authors: Pu Yuan;Yong Xiao;Guoan Bi;Liren Zhang
Year: 2017
Publisher: IEEE
Abstract: This paper studies the resource-allocation problem for a heterogeneous network (HetNet) in which the spectrum owned by a macrocell operator (MCO) can be shared by both unlicensed users (UUs) and licensed users (LUs). We formulate a novel hierarchical game theoretic framework to jointly optimize the transmit powers and subband allocations of the UUs and the pricing strategies of the MCO. In our framework, an overlapping coalition formation (OCF) game has been introduced to model the cooperative behaviors of the UUs. We then integrate this OCF game into a Stackelberg game-based hierarchical framework. We prove that the core of our proposed OCF game is nonempty and introduce an optimal subband-allocation scheme for UUs. A simple distributed algorithm is proposed for UUs to autonomously form an optimal coalition formation (CF) structure. The Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) of the proposed hierarchical game is derived, and its uniqueness and optimality are proved. A distributed joint optimization algorithm is also proposed to approach the SE of the game with limited information exchanges between the MCO and the UUs.
URI: http://localhost/handle/Hannan/144255
volume: 66
issue: 2
More Information: 1670,
1683
Appears in Collections:2017

Files in This Item:
File SizeFormat 
7458887.pdf1.18 MBAdobe PDF
Title: Toward Cooperation by Carrier Aggregation in Heterogeneous Networks: A Hierarchical Game Approach
Authors: Pu Yuan;Yong Xiao;Guoan Bi;Liren Zhang
Year: 2017
Publisher: IEEE
Abstract: This paper studies the resource-allocation problem for a heterogeneous network (HetNet) in which the spectrum owned by a macrocell operator (MCO) can be shared by both unlicensed users (UUs) and licensed users (LUs). We formulate a novel hierarchical game theoretic framework to jointly optimize the transmit powers and subband allocations of the UUs and the pricing strategies of the MCO. In our framework, an overlapping coalition formation (OCF) game has been introduced to model the cooperative behaviors of the UUs. We then integrate this OCF game into a Stackelberg game-based hierarchical framework. We prove that the core of our proposed OCF game is nonempty and introduce an optimal subband-allocation scheme for UUs. A simple distributed algorithm is proposed for UUs to autonomously form an optimal coalition formation (CF) structure. The Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) of the proposed hierarchical game is derived, and its uniqueness and optimality are proved. A distributed joint optimization algorithm is also proposed to approach the SE of the game with limited information exchanges between the MCO and the UUs.
URI: http://localhost/handle/Hannan/144255
volume: 66
issue: 2
More Information: 1670,
1683
Appears in Collections:2017

Files in This Item:
File SizeFormat 
7458887.pdf1.18 MBAdobe PDF