Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://localhost/handle/Hannan/141172
Title: Social Crowdsourcing to Friends: An Incentive Mechanism for Multi-Resource Sharing
Authors: Xiaoying Gan;Yuqing Li;Weiwei Wang;Luoyi Fu;Xinbing Wang
Year: 2017
Publisher: IEEE
Abstract: In this paper, we propose a novel game-based incentive mechanism for multi-resource sharing, where users are motivated to share their idle resources in view of conditional voluntary. Through social networking service platforms, such a crowdsourcing service fully explores the significant influence and computing potential of mobile social networks. Specifically, a combination of task allocation process, profit transfer process, and reputation updating process are involved in this sharing incentive mechanism, satisfying truthfulness, individual rationality, and robustness. To maintain the social fairness-efficiency tradeoff, we further develop a resource sharing algorithm on the basis of dominant resource fairness, revealing that the sacrifice of fairness properties is necessary for the improvement of efficiency. Real-world traces from Facebook are numerically studied, validating social fairness and efficiency of our social crowdsourcing mechanism.
URI: http://localhost/handle/Hannan/141172
volume: 35
issue: 3
More Information: 795,
808
Appears in Collections:2017

Files in This Item:
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7859267.pdf1.26 MBAdobe PDF
Title: Social Crowdsourcing to Friends: An Incentive Mechanism for Multi-Resource Sharing
Authors: Xiaoying Gan;Yuqing Li;Weiwei Wang;Luoyi Fu;Xinbing Wang
Year: 2017
Publisher: IEEE
Abstract: In this paper, we propose a novel game-based incentive mechanism for multi-resource sharing, where users are motivated to share their idle resources in view of conditional voluntary. Through social networking service platforms, such a crowdsourcing service fully explores the significant influence and computing potential of mobile social networks. Specifically, a combination of task allocation process, profit transfer process, and reputation updating process are involved in this sharing incentive mechanism, satisfying truthfulness, individual rationality, and robustness. To maintain the social fairness-efficiency tradeoff, we further develop a resource sharing algorithm on the basis of dominant resource fairness, revealing that the sacrifice of fairness properties is necessary for the improvement of efficiency. Real-world traces from Facebook are numerically studied, validating social fairness and efficiency of our social crowdsourcing mechanism.
URI: http://localhost/handle/Hannan/141172
volume: 35
issue: 3
More Information: 795,
808
Appears in Collections:2017

Files in This Item:
File SizeFormat 
7859267.pdf1.26 MBAdobe PDF
Title: Social Crowdsourcing to Friends: An Incentive Mechanism for Multi-Resource Sharing
Authors: Xiaoying Gan;Yuqing Li;Weiwei Wang;Luoyi Fu;Xinbing Wang
Year: 2017
Publisher: IEEE
Abstract: In this paper, we propose a novel game-based incentive mechanism for multi-resource sharing, where users are motivated to share their idle resources in view of conditional voluntary. Through social networking service platforms, such a crowdsourcing service fully explores the significant influence and computing potential of mobile social networks. Specifically, a combination of task allocation process, profit transfer process, and reputation updating process are involved in this sharing incentive mechanism, satisfying truthfulness, individual rationality, and robustness. To maintain the social fairness-efficiency tradeoff, we further develop a resource sharing algorithm on the basis of dominant resource fairness, revealing that the sacrifice of fairness properties is necessary for the improvement of efficiency. Real-world traces from Facebook are numerically studied, validating social fairness and efficiency of our social crowdsourcing mechanism.
URI: http://localhost/handle/Hannan/141172
volume: 35
issue: 3
More Information: 795,
808
Appears in Collections:2017

Files in This Item:
File SizeFormat 
7859267.pdf1.26 MBAdobe PDF