Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://dlib.scu.ac.ir/handle/1956/20461
Title: Searching for Deep Disagreement in Logic: The Case of Dialetheism
subject: Deep disagreements;Fogelin;Framework propositions;Logical disputes;Dialetheism;Contradictions
Publisher: Springer
Description: According to Fogelin’s account of deep disagreements, disputes caused by a clash in framework propositions are necessarily rationally irresolvable. Fogelin’s thesis is a claim about real-life, and not purely hypothetical, arguments: there are such disagreements, and they are incapable of rational resolution. Surprisingly then, few attempts have been made to find such disputes in order to test Fogelin’s thesis. This paper aims to rectify that failure. Firstly, it clarifies Fogelin’s concept of deep disagreement and shows there are several different breeds of such disagreements. Thus, to fully assess Fogelin’s thesis, it will be necessary to seek out cases of each breed to evaluate their rational irresolvability. Secondly, it begins this task by looking at a significant debate within the logical literature over the truth of contradictions. We demonstrate that, while the debate exemplifies a breed of deep disagreement, the parties involved can supply one another with rationally compelling reasons.
acceptedVersion
Journal Article
URI: https://bora.uib.no/handle/1956/20461
More Information: Martin BJL. Searching for Deep Disagreement in Logic: The Case of Dialetheism. Topoi. 2019
http://hdl.handle.net/1956/20461
1681912
10.1007/s11245-019-09639-4
Appears in Collections:Faculty of Humanities

Files in This Item:
Click on the URI links for accessing contents.
Title: Searching for Deep Disagreement in Logic: The Case of Dialetheism
subject: Deep disagreements;Fogelin;Framework propositions;Logical disputes;Dialetheism;Contradictions
Publisher: Springer
Description: According to Fogelin’s account of deep disagreements, disputes caused by a clash in framework propositions are necessarily rationally irresolvable. Fogelin’s thesis is a claim about real-life, and not purely hypothetical, arguments: there are such disagreements, and they are incapable of rational resolution. Surprisingly then, few attempts have been made to find such disputes in order to test Fogelin’s thesis. This paper aims to rectify that failure. Firstly, it clarifies Fogelin’s concept of deep disagreement and shows there are several different breeds of such disagreements. Thus, to fully assess Fogelin’s thesis, it will be necessary to seek out cases of each breed to evaluate their rational irresolvability. Secondly, it begins this task by looking at a significant debate within the logical literature over the truth of contradictions. We demonstrate that, while the debate exemplifies a breed of deep disagreement, the parties involved can supply one another with rationally compelling reasons.
acceptedVersion
Journal Article
URI: https://bora.uib.no/handle/1956/20461
More Information: Martin BJL. Searching for Deep Disagreement in Logic: The Case of Dialetheism. Topoi. 2019
http://hdl.handle.net/1956/20461
1681912
10.1007/s11245-019-09639-4
Appears in Collections:Faculty of Humanities

Files in This Item:
Click on the URI links for accessing contents.
Title: Searching for Deep Disagreement in Logic: The Case of Dialetheism
subject: Deep disagreements;Fogelin;Framework propositions;Logical disputes;Dialetheism;Contradictions
Publisher: Springer
Description: According to Fogelin’s account of deep disagreements, disputes caused by a clash in framework propositions are necessarily rationally irresolvable. Fogelin’s thesis is a claim about real-life, and not purely hypothetical, arguments: there are such disagreements, and they are incapable of rational resolution. Surprisingly then, few attempts have been made to find such disputes in order to test Fogelin’s thesis. This paper aims to rectify that failure. Firstly, it clarifies Fogelin’s concept of deep disagreement and shows there are several different breeds of such disagreements. Thus, to fully assess Fogelin’s thesis, it will be necessary to seek out cases of each breed to evaluate their rational irresolvability. Secondly, it begins this task by looking at a significant debate within the logical literature over the truth of contradictions. We demonstrate that, while the debate exemplifies a breed of deep disagreement, the parties involved can supply one another with rationally compelling reasons.
acceptedVersion
Journal Article
URI: https://bora.uib.no/handle/1956/20461
More Information: Martin BJL. Searching for Deep Disagreement in Logic: The Case of Dialetheism. Topoi. 2019
http://hdl.handle.net/1956/20461
1681912
10.1007/s11245-019-09639-4
Appears in Collections:Faculty of Humanities

Files in This Item:
Click on the URI links for accessing contents.